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This article analyzes whether improving gender diversity in boardrooms improves 
firms’ economic performance. In the context of French CAC40-listed companies 
between 2008 and 2012, this research uses instrumental variable panel regressions, 
including production frontier estimates, to arrive at two key results. First, gender 
diversity in boards depends on firms' attributes, including their previous gender 
promotion strategies. Second, promoting women in boardrooms has a significant and 
positive effect on economic performance, after accounting for the endogeneity of 
diversity. Gender diversity even reduces corporate inefficiencies and enables firms to 
come closer to their optimal performance. 
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I- Introduction 
 
Whereas women account for 56% of the workforce in Europe, they held only 11% of 
boardroom seats in large companies in 2013. Furthermore, they represent 45% of 
university graduates but only 14% of the directors of boards in large firms. These 
statistics highlight the continued existence of a glass ceiling and the persistent 
challenges women face in accessing the highest positions in organizations. In France, 
the situation appears slightly better; the percentage of female directors of boards 
reached 28% in 2013 among the 40 larger listed companies (CAC40), reflecting a 20 
percentage point increase over the past six years. This boom is largely a result of the 
2011 passage of the Copé-Zimmermann Act, which introduced a gender quota policy 
similar to Norway’s that requires the boards of large French companies to feature at 
least 40% women by 2017. 
 
This quota, designed to promote parity, was motivated by not just ethical and social 
responsibility reasons but also economic rationales. Because boards appoint and 
monitor CEOs and guide the firm's strategy (Bagliono and Colombo, 2013 ; Adams 
et al., 2010), boardroom composition has a strong impact on firm performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). For example, the share of insiders, defined as 
people who work for the firm or are closely related to it (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1999), and board size (Kini et al., 1995) tend to hinder performance. In addition, 
directors' own attributes, such as skills, networks, or experience, greatly influence 
firm performance (Terjesen et al., 2009). In their study of U.S. companies, Erhardt et 
al. (2003), assert that diversity on boards, in terms of gender and ethnicity, affects 
economic performance too. 
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With this study, we focus on gender diversity and consider several explanations for 
its strong influence, related to the distinct attributes exhibited by female and male 
directors. Female directors on average are more educated and attend different schools 
than their male peers (Singh et al., 2008). Female administrators also are younger 
(Ross-Smith and Bridge, 2008; Sealy et al., 2007) and have more international 
experience but less executive experience before their appointment (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2004). They come from the private sector but, unlike male directors, also 
may have worked in nonprofit organizations or the public sector, such as universities 
or research departments (Sealy et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2008). Finally, male 
directors' attributes tend to be similar to those of existing CEOs, in terms of their 
educational and professional paths, such that male directors gain close proximity to 
insiders. Female directors instead take the role of outsiders, with greater 
independence from CEOs (Peterson and Philpot, 2007), and they thus may be better 
able to monitor CEOs, with notable influences on company performance.  
 
Because female directors have different educational and professional paths than male 
directors, their human capital endowments also differ (Becker, 1964), which enables 
them to provide more external expertise (Hillman et al., 2000, 2007). With regard to 
their attitudes, women tend to be more sensitive to risk and more likely to adopt 
long-term strategies than are men (Byrnes et al., 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 
2008). They generally are better prepared for meetings (Huse and Solberg, 2006) and 
ask more questions than male directors (Konrad et al., 2008). Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) find that gender diversity on boards increases global directors' attendance and 
the probability of CEO turnover in response to poor economic results.  
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Accordingly, low gender diversity could deprive boards of the skills and resources 
held by female directors, potentially leading to suboptimal decisions and economic 
underperformance. Alternatively, quota policies that modify the functioning of 
boards and corporate governance could jeopardize the delicate balance among 
stakeholders in firms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Thus, despite substantial empirical 
literature devoted to this topic, no consensus has emerged. For example, Carter et al. 
(2003) study Fortune 100 companies and find a positive effect of the presence of 
women on boards on performance. This result is confirmed in US Community 
Developpment Loan Funds (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2012). But other studies 
indicate no significant effect (e.g., U.S. data, Carter et al., 2010; Danish data, Rose, 
2007; Fortune 500, Farrell and Hersch, 2005). Still others reveal a negative impact 
(Swedish data, Daunfeldt and Rudholm, 2012; U.S. data, Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Norwegian data, Ahren and Dittmar, 2012).  
 
This lack of consensus appears mainly due to three challenges to statistical 
evaluations of the impact of gender diversity on performance. First, companies 
operate in very different institutional (regulatory and legislative) contexts, which 
prevents researchers from establishing a homogenous effect of diversity. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) even argue that the impact of gender diversity on performance 
depends on the type of governance: In high governance settings, greater gender 
diversity leads to counterproductive overmonitoring of CEOs. Second, the promotion 
of women can produce a positive effect only if some minimum number is reached 
(Kanter, 1977). Below this threshold (estimated at three women), tokenism effects 
likely predominate, such that sole female directors are not sufficiently influential to 
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alter decisions. Third, diversity in boards is probably not an exogenous variable but 
instead reflects the firm's attributes, in particular the ownership structure (Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller, 2006), and the firm’s strategy (Adams et al., 2010; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Hillman et al., 2007; Moulin and Point, 2012), and that firm's 
characteristics and strategy themself influence performance. It is thus difficult to 
establish whether strategy, defined ex ante, or its resulting gender diversity actually 
influences performance.  
 
In France, despite the strong impacts of the Copé-Zimmermann Act, studies of the 
outcomes of the increased gender diversity in boards remain scarce (Landrieux-
Kartochian, 2004; Saint-Onge and Magnan, 2013) and mostly restricted to statistical 
observations of parity on boards or top management. Two exceptions are notable. 
First, Ferrary (2009, 2010) examines the effect of top management gender diversity 
on the performance of CAC40 companies and concludes that not only do the most 
diverse companies exhibit better average performance, but they were much more 
resilient to the subprime crisis. Second, Moulin and Point (2012) analyze the 
determinants of gender diversity on the boards of companies listed in the SBF120 in 
2008. It depends on various firm characteristics, but particularly the shareholding 
structure. These findings refute the notion that gender diversity is a random 
phenomenon. Yet neither of these important studies seeks to measure directly the 
performance implications of gender diversity in boardrooms. They also pertain to the 
period before passage of the Copé-Zimmermann Act. Therefore, we lack studies that 
explicate the effect of the women’s boardroom boom on performance. 
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To fill this gap and measure the effect of gender diversity in large companies on their 
performance, we construct an original database, compiled from the annual activity 
reports of listed CAC40 companies in 2012, for a five-year period (2008–2012). 
With these activity reports, we can identify, for each firm and each year, its 
economic performance, boardroom composition, and several other characteristics 
(e.g., size, industry). The database is thus a balanced panel of 200 observations. To 
quantify the impact of boards’ gender diversity on performance, we estimate 
instrumental variable panel regressions, while accounting for the endogeneity of 
boards' gender diversity. We complete these regressions with frontier estimates so 
that we can test whether improving gender diversity can help firms reach their 
optimal performance, that is, the performance they should attain if they optimally 
exploit their inputs, relative to others. With this econometric strategy, we can 
establish a global effect of gender diversity on performance, as well as quantify how 
much this diversity might limit corporate inefficiencies. 
 
The structure of our article is as follows: We present our data and basic statistics 
about female representation on corporate boardrooms, along with our methodological 
strategy, in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze the relation between diversity and 
performance. Section 4 concludes. 
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II- Data and methodology 
 
Data 
Our sample consists of a balanced panel of French companies, listed in the CAC40 
index in 2012. For each firm, we collected annual activity reports between 2008 and 
2012 and thus gathered rich information about the firms' characteristics (business 
segment, size, shareholding structure), performance, and boardroom composition. 
This sample comprises 200 firms, with 2,825 directors.  
 
We use three performance measures: return on equity (ROE), equal to the ratio of net 
income to shareholder equity; return on assets (ROA), or the ratio of net income to 
the book value of assets; and a proxy of Tobin's q, which uses the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to its book value. Unlike the first two measures, the Tobin's q focuses 
on expectations of future performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), so a Tobin's 
q ratio greater than 1 indicates the firm can create more value by using its available 
resources effectively. 
For the boardrooms, we calculate the percentage of female directors in each firm 
each year. We also observe if male directors are connected to female directors in 
other boardrooms and calculate, for each firm, the average ratio of women in 
connected boardrooms. This variable instruments for the fraction of female directors, 
because we suspect that when men are more connected to female directors, they are 
better able to promote gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). To take into 
account potential recurrence effect in the choice of directors, we also introduce a past 
indicator about the percentage of female directors on boards before the Copé-
Zimmerman reform. But, as past indicators can inform on firms' preference for 
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gender diversity, their inclusion as instruments could cause bias dude to time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. To overcome this problem, we choose to 
introduce not the past fraction of women but the variation in the pre-reform fraction 
of women on boards, as suggested by Ahern and Dittmar (2012). We provide these 
summary statistics in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Board characteristics 
Number of directors in boards 14.13 3.24 8 24 
Female directors fraction 0.16 0.12 0 0.62 
Female directors fraction in connected 
boardrooms 
0.15 0.11 0 0.66 
Variation in the pre-reform fraction of 
women (2003-2008) 
0.04 0.06 -0,04 0.25 
Performance  
Tobin's q -0.43 0.61 -3.09 0.87 
ROA 3.65 4.49 -10.49 41.48 
ROE 13.43 11.53 -32.57 51.33 
Firm characteristics 
Size (number of employees) 106 355.5 83 220.02 1 464 47 5976 
Date of creation 1 941 64 1 665 2 011 
Independence proxy 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Family-controlled firm 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Business sector (service) 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Notes: The independence proxy is a binary variable, equal to 1 if no shareholder holds more than 25% 
of the total shares of the company. 
 
 
Between 2008 and 2012, the female director fraction was 16% on average, though 
this mean value hides an extremely large increase, in that the percentage of female 
directors on boards increased from 10% in 2008 to nearly 27% in 2012, a 2.7-fold 
increase in just five years (see Figure 1). This clear boom of women in boardrooms 
mainly arose between 2010 and 2011, following passage of the Copé-Zimmermann 
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Act. The percentage of women on boards doubled over these two years. Moreover, 
over 80% of firms have surpassed the threshold of three women in their boards, 
which should enable gender diversity to produce positive effects (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Rate of female directors on boards  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of firms with at least three women on their boards 
 
 
 
To explore the potential statistical link between gender diversity and performance, 
we compared the performance achieved by two types of companies: those for which 
the percentage of female directors was below the sample median (low gender 
diversity) and those with percentages above the median (high gender diversity). As 
the results in Table 2 indicate, average performance is greater in companies with 
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high gender diversity on two performance indicators: ROE and Tobin's q. We found 
no statistical difference in ROA.  
 
Table 2. Average economic performance and gender diversity 
 
Performance Measure 
ROE ROA Tobin’s q 
Low diversity 12.65 3.67 0.66 
High diversity 14.09 3.64 0.87 
Total 13.43 3.66 0.77 
 
Our data also highlight links between gender diversity and firms' characteristics (see 
Table 3), such that companies with the most diverse boards (third and fourth 
quartiles for the gender diversity variable) seem more independent, more family-
controlled, older, and better positioned in the service sector. We find dynamics in 
gender diversity processes, because the proportion of female directors was, on 
average, greater on boards that promote more women ex ante. Finally, when board 
members previously were connected to more women on other boards, gender 
diversity was greater, suggesting that directors are sensitive to the gender diversity of 
other boards. 
 
Table 3. Gender diversity and firm attributes  
  
Fraction of Female Directors  
Total 
First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile 
Firms' attributes 
Independent firm 0.67 0.53 0.73 0.74 0.68 
Family-controlled firm 0.18 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.25 
Size 115 534.60 113 230.60 103 680.50 95 067.28 106 355.50 
Date of creation 1 948.90 1 952.58 1 935.49 1 929.26 1 940.80 
Business segment: services 0.16 0.35 0.35 0.43 0.33 
Instruments 
Female directors fraction in 
connected boardrooms 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.15 
Variation in the pre-reform fraction 
of women (2003-2008) 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 
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The descriptive statistics thus show a link between the percentage of female directors 
on boards and performance indicators, as well as a relationship between gender 
diversity and firms' attributes, which also could affect performance. To establish 
causal links across these variables, we undertake econometric analyses. 
 
Methodology 
 
Following previous empirical literature (e.g., Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), 
we estimate a performance equation using a panel model. We test two specifications: 
a random-effect model and a fixed effect model. The fixed effect model can control 
for any observed and unobserved firm characteristics that are constant over time and 
that may influence the firm's performance. To choose between the two models, we 
perform a Hausman test (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Moreover, to estimate the 
effect of gender diversity in boards on performance, we also must control for an 
endogeneity bias (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This bias is likely in our study, 
because the descriptive statistics revealed links between the percentage of female 
directors and firms' characteristics. Thus, unobserved variables, such as preferences 
about gender diversity or the corporate culture, likely affect both gender diversity 
and performance. When such a bias exists, an instrumental variables estimation 
procedure is required (Baltagi, 2013). This procedure consists of estimating the 
performance equation while correcting for the endogeneity of the rate of female 
directors on boards. We therefore use two instruments to explain the gender diversity 
variable: the fraction of female directors in connected boards, as recommended by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), and the variation in the pre-reform fraction of women  
on each board, to account for temporal recurrence effects in gender diversity 
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strategies (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). We perform a Hansen-Sargan 
overidentification test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004; Baum et al., 2003) to test 
the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
 
We perform these estimates with a frontier model, so that we can determine if gender 
diversity partly explains corporate inefficiencies in terms of economic performance. 
These inefficiencies reflect the difference between the performance achieved (i.e., 
output) and the means companies use to achieve this performance (i.e., inputs), as 
defined by Farrell (1957). If firms perfectly use their inputs, relative to other, 
equivalent firms, their relative performance is optimal, because it would not be 
possible for them to achieve better performance with the resources they deploy. In 
this optimal scenario, firms reach their production frontier. However, if firms do not 
fully exploit their inputs, their relative performance is lower than the performance 
they could achieve in an optimal situation. The difference between actual and 
optimal performance reveals the technical inefficiency, that is, the potential scope for 
improved performance if the inputs were used more effectively. 
 
Formally, we can estimate the frontier and inefficiency terms with a stochastic 
frontier method (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Belotti et al., 2012) and the following 
equation:  
                       ,     (3) 
where      indicates the performance of firm   at time   ;   is the vector of inputs 
(e.g., size, business segments); and   regroups the unobserved terms    , and 
inefficiency parameters       , as:  
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                    (4) 
 
Following Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994), we test whether the 
inefficiency parameters,       , depend on observed factors, and gender diversity in 
particular; we define these parameters as: 
            
 (          
 ), with       (    ),  (5) 
where    contains a constant and the gender diversity variable.  
 
Because the percentage of female directors may depend on specific characteristics 
(and thus be endogenous), we adopt a two-step method. First, we consider the 
percentage of women, given the characteristics of the company, the proportion of 
female directors in the previous year, and the percentage of women in connected 
boards. Second, we estimate the effect of the predicted ratio of women on boards 
(from the first step) on the inefficiency parameters. Thus we are sure to measure the 
real impact of gender diversity on performance
1
. 
 
 
III- Results and discussion 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the ROE performance indicator; the parallel results 
for ROA and Tobin's q are in the appendix, because we find no significant 
differences in the results across these performance indicators. 
First, let us comment the robustness of our estimates. Our panel estimates give very 
close results about the impact of the women fraction on boards on firm's 
                                                        
1 Note that we estimate separate regressions for the 2008-2010 period, that is before the women boom on boards 
and afterwards. Results do not vary accross the periods. 
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performance. But, the Hausman test leads us to prefer the random effect panel model 
to the fixed effect one. Time-invariant covariates (economic sector, independency 
proxy, business segments) included in the random effect model seem thus to 
sufficient to capture firms' heterogeneity. Moreover, the Hansen-Sargan test calls for 
a validity of our instruments, which are not correlated with errors terms. Finally, our 
estimates can be qualified as robust. 
 
Across variables, we note that gender diversity is not an exogenous variable; it 
depends strongly on firm attributes. In our data, business segments, size, and the 
ownership structure (related to the degree of independence or a family ownership) 
have no impact on gender diversity, in contrast with prior studies (e.g., Moulin and 
Point, 2012 or Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Nor does past firm performance 
influence gender diversity. Contrary to Farrell and Hersch’s (2013) findings among 
Fortune 500 companies before the 2000s, we find that the most efficient firms do not 
necessarily have more diversity on their boards. Finally, similar to Daunfledt and 
Rudholm (2012), we highlight a one-way effect from gender diversity to 
performance, not a simultaneous effect. 
 15 
Table 4. Determinants of gender diversity on boards 
  Fraction of Women ROE ROE ROE 
  Model 1 
Model 2: Random 
effect panel 
Model 3: Fixed effect 
panel 
Model 4: Frontier 
Constant 0.167 2.903 3.013 35.459 
  (1.056) (0.548) (0.345) (1.276) 
Highly independent firm 0.013 1.872** - 3.145** 
  (0.785) (2.004)  (2.174) 
Family-controlled firm 0.015 0.073** - 0.562** 
 (1.231) (1.966)  (1.973) 
Independent firm x Family-controlled firm 0.007 0.003* - 0.002* 
 (0.963) (1.867)  (1.898) 
Firm size (in logarithms) -0.012 3.521** 3.397** 1.301*** 
  (-1.195) (2.213) (2.278) (3.645) 
Business segment: service 0.012 -0.073 - -1.209 
  (0.656) (-0.589)  (-0.784) 
Date of firm's creation 0.001 -2.582 - -0.007 
  (0.023) (-1.384)  (-0.112) 
Number of directors in boards -0.014* 0.001 0.002 0.372 
  (-1.762) (0.096) (0.104) (1.456) 
Past performance (at t – 1) 0.005 0.121* 0.113* 0.353*** 
  (0.238) (1.943) (1.949) (6.027) 
Variation in the pre-reform fraction of women 
(2003-2008) 
0.289***    
  (5.027)    
Fraction of women on connected boards 0.336***    
  (4.784)    
Fraction of female directors   1.951** 1.949**  
   (2.056) (1.998)  
 16 
Mu    16.457*** 
     (14.126) 
Vsigma    -10.562 
     (-0.870) 
Inefficiency terms     
Estimated fraction of women on boards (Model 1)    -0.755*** 
     (-2.495) 
Constant    -0.756*** 
     (-2.467) 
R2 (total) 0.612 0.523 
 
0.519 
 
Log of likelihood    -559.034 
Hausman test value (FE model vs. RE model)  2.084  
Hansen-Sargan test value  2.672 2.856  
Number of observations 160 160 160 160 
Number of firms 40 40 40 40 
 
Notes: Student's t values appear in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
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In contrast, boards' attributes strongly explain gender diversity. The number of 
directors exerts a negative effect on diversity, which may be because in our data, the 
largest boards are characterized by more multiple directorships, which is a practice 
more common among men than women. We thus posit that French companies might 
face difficulties in recruiting directors. Limiting board sizes would facilitate 
directors' cooptation, especially for women. Furthermore, we note strong temporal 
recurrence effects in gender diversity that have been neglected in previous literature. 
The more diverse boards have been in the past (higher variation in the pre-reform 
fraction of women on boards), the more diverse they are in the future. This benefit 
may stem from learning effects related to the recruitment and appointment of female 
directors, or else reflect network and reputational effects. Similar to Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), we find that when male directors are connected to gender-diverse 
other boards, the percentage of female directors in the focal board is higher. Male 
directors thus seems more likely to recruit female directors when they participate in 
other diverse boards or when their network includes more women, either because 
they are more familiar with diversity or are better able to assess women's distinct 
skills (Carli, 2000). In turn, they function well as prescribers of gender diversity. 
 
The women’s boardroom boom observed during 2008–2012 contributed to better 
firm performance, all else being equal. This result is in line with Ferrary’s (2010) 
conclusion of a positive performance effect of gender diversity in top management. 
Our data do not indicate a strong risk of tokenism though (Kanter, 1977), in that 
most observed companies already have exceeded the critical threshold of three 
female directors. Gender diversity, invoked mainly by the Copé-Zimmermann Act, 
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thus has positive results in terms of better representation of women and from an 
economic perspective.  
 
According to our frontier estimates, accelerating gender diversity on boards would 
reduce corporate inefficiency and allow companies to approach their optimal 
performance level. The firms in our sample achieved, at best, only 83% of their 
optimal performance (Table 5). As our results highlight, to reduce corporate 
inefficiencies, companies should increase the gender diversity of their boards, 
because the female director ratio has a significant, negative effect on inefficiency. In 
Table 4 (Model 4), a 10-percentage point increase in the number of women on 
boards reduces inefficiencies by about seven points, bringing firms in closer 
proximity to their optimal performance.  
 
Table 5. Corporate inefficiency terms  
  Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROE 17.034 8.756 0.015 55.867 
ROA 21.115 7.082 0.043 47.045 
Tobin's q 19.689 6.059 0.004 50.139 
 
 
From the 26.6% average percentage of women on boards in 2012, an increase of 10 
percentage points would imply compliance with the quota imposed by the Copé-
Zimmermann Act but also help firms achieve 90% of their performance potential. 
Our analysis thus emphasizes the economic benefits for CAC40-listed companies 
that promote more women to boards. However, our quantitative analysis cannot 
specify which mechanism underlies this positive impact. Prior literature offers some 
ideas. For example, the effect could result from the more efficient, stronger control 
exerted by more diverse boards, which tend to exhibit more independence from 
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CEOs (Carter et al., 2003). In contrast with some predicted fears (e.g., Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), the women’s boom in boardrooms has not led to overmonitoring. In 
addition, gender diversity might introduce new skills to boards (Hillman et al., 
2000), which could improve their effective decision making or enhance their risk 
considerations.   
 
IV- Conclusion 
A real women’s boom has been observed in French corporate boards following the 
passage of the Copé-Zimmermann Act in 2011. Anticipating the 40% quota for 
female directors by 2017, large companies have begun recruiting more women, such 
that the percentage of women on boards has increased by about 20 points in six 
years, to reach 28% in 2013. The impact of this shift on firm performance has not 
been studied previously, and the lack of consensus in research predictions offers no 
insights into its effects. 
 
We have sought to fill this gap by analyzing companies listed in CAC40 in 2012, 
over a five-year period (2008–2012). The original (balanced panel) database enables 
us to observe economic performance indicators, the percentage of women on boards, 
and other key business attributes (e.g., independence indicator, size, industry). Using 
an instrumental panel model and a frontier model, we thus uncovered three notable 
results. First, gender diversity is strongly influenced by firm characteristics, 
including previous gender diversity and gender diversity in connected boards. 
Recruiting female directors is not a random process but rather a result of a corporate 
strategy, implemented over the long run. Second, when we account for the 
endogeneity of gender diversity in boards, we find a significant and positive effect on 
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performance. Companies whose boards are more diverse in terms of gender achieve 
higher performance indicators, all else being equal. Third, by promoting gender 
diversity, firms can approach their optimal performance level, defined as the 
performance that they should achieve, were they to exploit their inputs perfectly. 
 
From a public policy point of view, our results indicate that introducing quotas for 
women’s representation on boards has prompted French companies to recruit more 
female directors. This of course needs to be studied in a more extended period to take 
into account potential long-term effects. But, this gender diversity in turn has short 
term positive effects for corporate social responsibility and diversity goals, as well as 
for economic performance. To encourage further gender diversity, several additional 
motivators are available. For example, smaller boards are preferable to avoid 
multiple directorships, which is a practice mainly adopted by men. Firms should 
appoint male directors who already are linked with female directors on other boards, 
because these more diverse networks facilitate the recruitment of female directors. 
Finally, current gender diversity efforts have positive long-term effects on the future 
recruitment of female directors. Companies therefore should regard the integration of 
women into their boards as investments that produce positive effects in both the short 
and the long term. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Gender diversity and performance (random effect model) 
  ROA Tobin's q 
Fraction of Women 0.407** 0.324** 
  (2.092) (1.978) 
High independent firm 0.907* 0.044* 
  (1.944) (1.907) 
Family-controlled firm 0.321* 0.056** 
  (1.940) (1.973) 
Independent firm x family control firm 0.004* 0.003* 
  (1.945) (1.834) 
Firm size (in logarithms) 2.106*** 2.481*** 
  (2.902) (2.946) 
Business segment: service -0.623 -0.657 
  (-0.904) (-1.329) 
Date of firm's creation -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.561) (-0.129) 
Number of directors in boards -0.046 -0.041 
  (-0.388) (-0.921) 
ROA in t – 1 0.186**  
  (2.089)  
Tobin's q in t – 1  0.779*** 
   (2.978) 
Constant 16.467 0.812 
  (1.212) (1.003) 
 R
2
 (total) 0.497 0.563 
Number of observations 160 160 
Number of firms 40 40 
Notes: Student's t values are in brackets. 
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
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Table A2: Gender diversity and performance (frontier model) 
 ROA Tobin's q 
High independent firm 2.803** 3.308** 
  (2.102) (2.034) 
Family-controlled firm 0.176* 0.047* 
  (1.948) (1.907) 
Independent firm x family control firm 0.003* 0.001* 
  (1.932) (1.916) 
Firm size (in logarithms) 1.705*** 0.981*** 
  (2.437) (3.175) 
Business segment: service -0.893 -0.993 
  (-1.459) (-0.862) 
Date of firm's creation -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.131) (-0.087) 
Number of directors in boards 0.397 0.356 
  (1.476) (1.401) 
ROA in t – 1 0.223***  
  (5.129)  
Tobin's q in t – 1  0.367*** 
   (5.903) 
Constant 30.005 26.158 
  (1.346) (1.364) 
   
Mu 16.976*** 16.803*** 
  (13.951) (13.751) 
Vsigma -12.891 -13.708 
  (-1.034) (-0.937) 
Inefficiency terms   
Estimated fraction of female directors on boards -0.691*** -0.708*** 
  (-2.765) (-2.231) 
Constant -0.645*** -0.810*** 
  (-2.773) (-2.592) 
Log Likelihood -572.618 -565.769 
Number of observations 160 160 
Number of firms 40 40 
Notes: Student's t values are in brackets. 
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
